

**Seeking a common understanding on issues of
the atomic bombings: from the viewpoint of Nagasaki**

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(※ Translation: Masatsugu Chijiwa)

「原爆投下問題への共通認識を求めて－長崎の視点から」

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Introduction

This year, 2015, marks 70 years since the atomic bombings and the end of the Asia-Pacific War. However, there still remain unresolved issues, including Japanese war responsibility and postwar compensation for comfort women and forcible taking. This casts a dark shadow over friendly relations between Asian countries and Japan, especially between South Korea and China on the one hand, and Japan on the other. Moreover, in the relationship between Japan and the United States there exists the US responsibility for dropping atomic bombs, which can be regarded as the most negative legacy in the 20th century (or in the Second World War and the Cold War). The US positions, which has consistently continued to justify the atomic bombing in terms of its contribution to swift war ending and lifesaving, is found to be reflected in the Bush administration policy toward nuclear weapons. Its policy not only advanced the development of new tactical nuclear weapons but also clearly expressed the intention to use them preemptively. In order to prevent the worst situation from being materialized, in which Washington would use nuclear weapons in the near future at places such as North Korea, we should promptly achieve a common understanding of the atomic bombings not only between Japan and the US but also among all nations of the world.

“I do not think that it was necessary to drop atomic bombs. It was not a sensible choice. But state leaders in the midst of a war do not always figure out every development. My strong impression is that all of the three, President Truman, General Marshall and Army Secretary Stimson, who made the decision to drop two bombs, might not have known the details about serious damages that Japanese cities had suffered from fierce bombings on March. If there had not been the atomic bombing, we could have averted the coming of the age of nuclear arms race, and there would not have been the current problem of North Korea.”¹

This is the testimony given by Robert McNamara, who served as Secretary of Defense under both Kennedy and Johnson administration, in an interview to a Japanese media on January, 2004. On the presupposition that the Second World War including the Asia-Pacific War was “the just war” or “the good war” for US, successive US Presidents have been justifying its atomic bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki for the reason that the bombing was required to end the war swiftly and to save a large number of lives. This is what we call the “atomic bombing myth.” Given this sustained support to the “atomic bombing myth” in the US, I think it is very important that the former top official voiced his sincere remorse and criticism about the US atomic bombings on Japan. And it should be kept in mind that this frank statement could not be made possible without gradually but constantly accumulated studies on the atomic bombing by scholars and journalist mainly from Japan and the US.

For my part I specialize in Eastern European studies, including ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia, so I have been concerned about the tragic realities triggered by the disintegration of former Yugoslavia and its accompanying successive civil wars, beginning from Slovenia through Croatia and Bosnia to Kosovo.

Finally at the end of 20th century, March 1999, the ideas of “just wars” or “wars for humanity” were put forward in the course of NATO airstrikes on Yugoslavia. As a result, we can find the development in which these new concepts have been accepted as a new form of warfare in 21st century. But these ideas cannot be justified if we inquire into process and substance of NATO airstrikes. Rather in my conclusion they

constituted an “aggression against a sovereign state” and “blatant war crimes.”² However the problem is that these developments have been accelerated and bolstered with the incident of 9.11 as a turning point, which happened in the US at the dawn of 21st century.

This article firstly reexamines the “atomic bombing myth”, and then based on the reexamination inquires about not only the implication of the second atomic bombing on Nagasaki, but also relationships between indiscriminate bombardments and the atomic bombings. In the last section I intend to consider common problems surrounding atomic bombs and nuclear weapons between past and present by critically analyzing a strategy of nuclear preemptive use under the Bush administration. It goes without saying that the United States was deeply involved in all these issues, as “militarily mightiest state in the world”, and as then Japanese enemy but as now its ally. Additionally, in my opinion, each issue represents some features of contemporary warfare. This means that addressing these questions is indispensable in considering what a peaceful order ought to be and what Japanese response should be in the 21st century.

The past arguments over the atomic bombings have focused too much on Hiroshima, and thereby rarely questioned the implications of the second atomic bomb on Nagasaki. Therefore this article approaches the issues associated with the atomic bombings, especially from the perspective of Nagasaki. Moreover I would like to mention somewhat my personal things. I was born in Kokura, Kitakyushu, where the second atomic bomb would have been dropped as originally planned if it had been fine in the sky above the city. And since my childhood I strongly felt that I had close relationships with the atomic bombing of Nagasaki. For that reason I have come to research atomic bombing issues³.

1. Emancipation from the “atomic bombing myth”: the true reason for the atomic bombings and the surrender of Japan

The conventional arguments over the atomic bombings, largely influenced by the US, are more centered on the question of whether it was militarily necessary to drop atomic bombs. This way of questioning has shaped how we argue about the atomic bombings in such a manner that if it was necessary it was justified; alternatively if not it was not justified. But it seems that these arguments have inherent contradictions in themselves, because from the viewpoint of ethics, morality or humanity, the very development of atomic bombs was wrong in the first place even if for the sole reason of coping with a menace of Nazi Germany. Still less the use of atomic bombs was an inhuman atrocity, which could never be justified under any circumstance. This position is related with the recent worldwide grass-root campaign which claims to judge atomic bombings as violation of international law, “war crimes” and “crimes against humanity” in an international court.

Based on this and from the vantage point of the present time, this article attempts to revisit the

2. See, for example, Akira Kimura, “‘Yoroppa no syuhenjitai’ toshiteno kosobohunsou: NATOkuubaku no seitousei wo megutte,” *Nihon no kagakusya*, vol.35 (July 2000); Masatsugu Chijiwa, “Kokusaisyakai niokeru ippoutekijindoutekikainyuu no seitousei wo megutte: NATO niyoru Yugoslavia kubaku wo jirei ni,” *Hikakushakaibunkakenkyuu*, vol.12 (2002); Masahide Iwata, *Syakaisyugihoukai kara taminzokusensou he: essei seikimatsu no megakaosu* (Ochanomizusyobou, 2003).

3. See, as related article on this matter, Akira Kimura, “‘Genbakushinwa’ karano kaihou: ‘seigi no sensou’ toha nanika,” *Nagasakiheiwakenkyuu*, vol.12 (2001); idem, “Genbakutouka to musabetubakugeki: jyuukei kara Hiroshima to Nagasaki he,” *Nagasakiheiwakenkyuu*, vol.16 (October 2004); idem, “‘Seigi no senseo’ to beikokugenbaku to rekkaurandan wo musubumono,” in Akira Kimura (ed.), *Higashijia no heiwa to genbaku no kiroku* (Houritsubunkasya, 2005).

1. *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 31 January 2004.

following questions: why were atomic bombs dropped to Japan?; was it actually needed to drop atomic bombs on Japan?; can dropping two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki be really justified?; and can we identify some links between atomic bombing and the Soviet's war entry on the one hand and the surrender of Japan on the other?

After World War II the US made up the "atomic bombing myth" and "fictional logic" in order to justify its atomic bombing and to cover up the most atrocious war crimes during the war. This is summarized as follows: "the atomic bombings compelled Japan to surrender and made quick war-ending possible, thereby saving not only 500,000 to 1,000,000 lives of the US soldiers, but also much more lives of Japanese and Asians. For these reasons the atomic bombings were both necessary and justifiable humanitarian acts." This view of the atomic bombings as contributing to swift war-ending and life-saving is the US official position to date, and still endorsed by many American people with no doubt. Moreover, there is an unfortunate reality that even most Japanese unconsciously accept this US official view just as it is, because the Japanese government has been consistent in not strongly denying and even showing positive attitude toward the US official view. However it becomes increasingly revealed that this atomic bombing myth is not based on facts, but nothing more than a fiction, which was contrived intentionally by post-war powers (occupation forces and the Japanese government).

First of all what we have to confirm is the basic fact, as Martin Sherwin, a US professor pointed out, that "Atomic bombs delayed the conclusion of the Second World War rather than hastened it"⁴ Through the Military Policy Committee of the Manhattan Project in May 1943 and Hyde Park agreement with Britain in September 1944, the US almost had decided to target at Japan for atomic bombings. Several reasons have been identified for the target change from Germany to Japan. Some explained that given Japanese intellectual level, it would have been considered to be unlikely that there might be a leakage of information on atomic bombs to Japan if atomic bombing had resulted in failure. Others pointed out a fear on the part of the US that there would have been some retaliation with radioactive materials if atomic bombs had been dropped on Germany. But I cannot rule out the possibility that racial bias against Japanese contributed to the target change. Moreover, as suggested by the testimony of General Groves that "we targeted at Japan from the very start," there is also a possibility that this decision had been made much earlier, for example, in the year of 1939 when the production of B29 capable of carrying atomic bombs was started, or in the year of 1941 when B29 was actually deployed in the Asia-Pacific region and its flight training initiated⁵.

In addition the US knew accurately through monitoring and decoding that since the spring of 1945 Japan had been requesting the Soviet Union to play an intermediate role in ending the war, and it was possible to moderate terms of surrender in a manner that a draft of Potsdam Proclamation initially had contained some wordings recognizing "maintenance of the Emperor system". It should be kept in mind that while the US top officials such as Under-Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard, Under-Secretary of State Joseph Grew, Secretary of War Henry Stimson demanded "the clarification for terms of surrender," in short partial revisions to conditions of surrender so as to permit the continued existence of Emperor system, they did not think those revisions were conflicting with "unconditional surrender." However finally at the last stage, President Truman accepted the advice from Secretary of State James Byrnes and deleted clauses recognizing the maintenance of Emperor system. Besides, Potsdam Proclamation did not include a signature by the Soviet Union which had been initially planned. This resulted from the US intentions: to exclude the

4. "Interview with Professor Martin Sherwin," in Chuugokusinbun (ed.), *Kakujidai: kinou, kyou, asu* (Chuugokusinbunshya, 1995), p.36.

Soviet Union, which originally the US and the UK had strongly requested to enter the war before testing of an atomic bomb turned out to be successful; and instead, to make Chiang Kaishek hastily participate in the declaration. Furthermore, on the contrary to claims put forward by the US later on, it was not something like an official ultimatum or prior warning to an atomic bombing in a way that it was not issued through a formal diplomatic route and did not have time for response. Therefore the US dared to pose "unconditional surrender" to Japan on the anticipation that Japan would reject the Proclamation.

For the purpose of ascertaining that the testing of the atomic bomb would turn out to be successful, President Truman tried to postpone the opening of Potsdam Conference up to July 15, although it had been due to be started on July 1. At the same time he attempted to delay as much as possible the conclusion of an agreement between Chinese Chiang Kaishek government and the Soviet Union government. Then he had made actual decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan on July 25 before Potsdam Proclamation was issued on July 26. Moreover, in contradiction to the recommendation put forward by some scientists, President Truman finally dismissed the option to drop atomic bombs on Tokyo Bay or other uninhabited islands in order to demonstrate devastating effects of the bomb as a "prior warning" to Japan. It follows from these facts that President Truman wanted to create at all costs certain conditions, where the US could anyhow drop atomic bombs that had been successfully developed shortly before Potsdam Conference, and that therefore he intentionally prolonged the termination of the war.

With regard to the view of atomic bombings as contributing to saving lives, President Truman claimed in the postwar days that from half a million to one million deaths would have been lost if the US had not dropped atomic bombs. It is clear that the number was exaggerated, compared to the following estimations: according to the document for the Whitehouse meeting on June 18, 1945, the operation of landing Kyusyu was anticipated to involve no more than 20,000 US soldier deaths; and the proposed exhibitions in Smithsonian Museum, which had been planned to be held in 1995, pointed out the estimation of 63,000 deaths. Furthermore, given the fact that about 200,000 people including a large number of Korean, Chinese and war prisoners from allied powers—130,000 in Hiroshima and 70,000 in Nagasaki— had fallen victims to atomic bombing up to the end of 1945, and the fact that 350,000 people up to this year died of and suffered from two atomic bombs, and there are still a lot of Hibakusha suffering from aftereffects of radiation, the justification for the atomic bombings that the US had given "due consideration" to possible Japanese sacrifices now turns out to be ridiculous.

Fundamentally we have to examine the following questions: how should we understand the fact that then US government thought that probably the Soviet entry into the war would make Japan surrender, and that if it occurred, it would be unnecessary to mount a landing operation against Japan's mainland (including not only a planned landing operation on Kanto region on 1 March 1946, but also a landing operation on Kyusyu on 1 November 1945)?; and additionally regardless of the size of sacrifices to the both sides that newly attacks would have caused, is it very futile in itself to argue on its justification without questioning the critical distinction between combatants on the one hand and noncombatants on the other hand ?

5. According to Hiroshi Iwaki, the US decided to drop atomic bombs on Japan already at the point of 1939. See, Hiroshi Iwaki, *Gendaisekaitaisei to shihonchikuseki* (touyoukeizaishinpousya, 1989), p.16. Moreover according to Stewart L. Udall, Germany did not have any definite plans to develop an atomic bomb, and both the US and the UK knew the fact at the early stage of 1939 to 1942. See, Stewart L. Udall, *Hachigatsu no shinwa: genshiryoku to reisen ga amerika ni motarasita higeki* (Jijitsushinsya, 1995), pp.39-47. [*The myths of August: a personal exploration of our tragic Cold War affair with the atom*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1994].

So why did the US have to drop atomic bombs on Japan so rapidly at that period? In the background there was a growing conflict between the US and the Soviet Union at the stage of then Europe, the cold war. There was an agreement reconfirmed in Yalta Conference, which specified that the Soviet Union shall participate in the war against Japan three months after Germany's surrender (which actually happened on May 8, 1945). The agreement was based on the deal between the US and the Soviet Union, which meant that on the hand the US had asked the Soviet Union to attack Kwantung Army in Manchuria and on the other hand the Soviet Union favorably had responded to this request in return for the recognition of its interests in Manchuria and northern territories. And the agreement was considered to be effective at the point of the atomic bombings. The US handled things so hastily in a short period from July 16, when the testing of an atomic bomb turned out to be successful, to August 6, when the US dropped the bomb, in part because it had to force Japan to surrender by August 15, when the Soviet Union had pledged to participate in the war against Japan in Potsdam Conference. In other words, the greatest aim for Washington was that if the atomic bombing could compel Japan to capitulate, or even if Japan surrendered after the Soviet war entry, it could contain the expansion of Soviet's influence in Asia including an occupation policy of the postwar Japan. In that respect, the "atomic bombing was the first large-scale operation against Russia in the ongoing cold diplomatic war, rather than the final military action in the Second World War" (British professor P. M. S. Blackett)⁶, and this was the very true reason for the US to drop atomic bombs on Japan.

The "atomic bombing myth" is also comprised of another view, according to which the atomic bomb was a sort of "special providence" that constituted the biggest factor for Japanese surrender⁷. This interpretation justifies the US position that there was no other option but to drop atomic bombs in order to compel Japan to surrender. At the same time it was also a convenient logic for Japan, especially for the military which wanted to think that Japan lost the war not because of Japanese strategy or mental strength, but because of scientific divides between Japan and the US. This view wrongly underestimates influences posed by the Soviet war entry, which was in fact hastened up to August 8 by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. This has been accepted not only by the occupation force and the US government, but also the Japanese government since the end of the war. Nevertheless it has become increasingly clear from Japanese researches that the impact of the Soviet participation in the war was much more devastating and critical for Japan⁸. Though I do not intend to reject the importance of these arguments, here I need to emphasize their significant pitfall, whose main interest lies in the question of which of the "double shocks" was critical factor in compelling Japan to surrender, the atomic bombing or the Soviet war entry. It is because that if we think that the atomic bombing was "inhuman decision (unforgivable choice)" and "violation of international law (war crimes)," we have to ask in the first place that all peaceful and military means but the atomic bombing should have been taken.

In any event fierce strategic bombings and the full-fledged naval blockade by the US diminished the most of Japanese capabilities to sustain war-fighting at that time. It is abundantly clear that Japan would have surrendered shortly after the Soviet entry into the war without a landing operation against Kyushu and the atomic bombing. The basic fact we have to emphasize is that neither the Soviet participation in the war nor the atomic bombing forced Japan to surrender at the time of August 15; rather "Byrnes' reply" issued

6.P.M.S. Blackett, *Kyohu, sensou, bakudan: genshiryoku no gunjiteki, seijitekiito* (Houseidaigakusyuppanyoku, 1951), p.211. [*Fear, war, and the bomb: military and political consequences of atomic energy*, New York : Whittlesey House, 1948].

7.As one representative view, see, Sadao Asada, "Genbakutouka no syougeki to kouhuku no kettei: genbakuronsou no aratana shiza," Sekai, no.616 (December 1995); idem, "Genbakutouka no syougeki to kouhuku no kettei," in Chihiro Hosoya et al (eds.), *Taiheiyousensou no shyuketsu: ajia-taiheiyou no sengoisei* (Kashiwashyobou, 1997).

as the final official response from the US to Japan after two atomic bombings, conclusively enabled Japan to surrender, because it assured indirectly the maintenance of Emperor system, which had been deliberately deleted in Potsdam Proclamation.

On the whole the supreme goal in the atomic bombing of Japan was to exercise threat and deterrence against the Soviet Union in preparation for a coming cold war, and further to establish the US global hegemony (nuclear peace, domination of the world by the US based on power) in the post-war period. For that purpose the US prolonged Japanese surrender by the day when an opportunity presented itself to drop atomic bombs. As soon as atomic bombs were ready to be operationalized, the US rushed to drop atomic bombs without giving a clear warning in advance. The logic employed by the US to justify its atomic bombings, "the view of the atomic bombings as contributing to swift war-ending and life-saving" is not convincing. Even if the atomic bombing was truly intended to protect a great number of US servicemen, it still constituted a flagrant violation of international law because it involved a mass murder of noncombatants for the purpose of averting sacrifices of combatants⁹.

If the US atomic bombing of Japan cannot be justified for any reason, this does not necessarily mean that we can deny Japanese responsibility for waging wars of aggression. We must not forget insanity of then Japanese war leaders who cling to the maintenance of the Emperor System at the expense of its own nationals, largely contributed to the prolonged war. In this respect, on the contrary to the generally prevalent view in the post-war era, "Emperor's sacred decision" did not save Japanese people. Rather the truth is that it was made too late. If it had been made much earlier, then atomic bombings, the Soviet war entry and even the tragic battle of Okinawa could have been prevented and a large number of sacrifices averted. This point is of much significance, not least because there is the fact that until just before the Japanese surrender, the US government kept the option to drop the third atomic bomb on Japan, and military generals (such as Groves, Marshall, and Arnold) were making preparation for next targets, Tokyo and Kyoto.

With regard to Japanese responsibility for inviting the atomic bombings, I need to add the fact that Japan since the Meiji era had held colonial rule and even waged wars of aggression as the continuation of colonialism, particularly the Japanese military had committed atrocities, including indiscriminate bombings on Chongqing and Nanking Massacre. This resulted in providing the excuses for Allied Powers, especially the US, which claimed 'justice' in the battle of democracy against fascism, to justify its apparent "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity," such as massed air raids on Tokyo and two atomic bombings targeting at the urban population. Given this perspective it could be argued that the atomic bombings were a kind of collaboration or bilateral works between Japan and the US. In other words, the atomic bombings resulted from the fact that on the one hand Japan cling to "the maintenance of Emperor system" and on the other hand the US adhered to "unconditional surrender" to the last minute. Moreover, the decision to drop atomic bombs and its grievous consequence were major tragedies for both Japanese and American people in

8 See, as some leading arguments, Aritsune Nishijima, *Genbaku ha naze touka saretanoka: nihonkouhuku wo meguru senryaku to gaikou, new edition* (Aokisyoten, 1992); Shinichi Arai, *Genbakutouka heno michi* (Tokyo University Press, 1995); Eiichi Shindou, *Sengo no genzou: Hiroshima kara Nagasaki he* (Iwanamisyoten, 1999).

9. See, for example, Edward St John, *America ha yuuzai data: kaku no kyoudi no motoni*, vol. 1 and 2, (Asahishinbunsha, 1995); Masaaki Tanaka, *Perl hanji no nihonmuzairon* (Shougakukan, 2001); C.G. Weeramantry, *Kakuheiki to kagakusya no sekinin* (Chuo University Press, 1987); Yasuhiro Matsui, *Genbakusaiban: kakuheikihaizetsu to hibakushaengo no houri* (Shinnihonsyuppanya, 1986).

a sense that they brought something like a hellish suffering to Japanese, while they forced Americans to lose a moral pride for their country and to suffer from a guilty conscience of committing irrecoverable crimes.

2. What does the second atomic bombing on Nagasaki imply?

A variety of reasons has so far been given to explain the US atomic bombings on Japan mainly in American scholarly studies. For example some confirm the US official view of “achieving swift war-ending,” others argue that they were for exercising a coercion and deterrence against the Soviet Union, and establishing the US hegemony in the post-war world. Moreover additional reasons could be identified as follows: retaliation for Japanese “sneaking” attack on Pearl Harbor and abusive treatments of prisoners of war such as the Bataan Death March, influenced by the racial bias against Japanese; pressures from the US Congress and the American public to retrieve the huge development costs of 2 billion dollars; the need to test a devastating power of a new weapon and its effects on human body in the actual combat situation; the negative legacy from Roosevelt and “momentum” of the Manhattan Project; and ambition and racial prejudice of the US leaders such as Truman, Byrnes and Groves¹⁰.

When it comes to Japanese scholarly researches on the atomic bombings, they can generally be classified into four tendencies. First they shift a focal point away from the political and military question centered on “the necessity and legitimacy of the atomic bombings,” and toward the question of “morality of the atomic bombings” approached from the humanitarian and international law perspective.” Second, with regard to the explanation for the US intention to drop atomic bombs they put an emphasis on human experiment rather than on deterrence against the Soviet Union in as the origin of the cold war. The third tendency is to point out some similarities between the atomic bombings and other forms of “genocides” such as Auschwitz and massacre of Nanjing. Fourth, instead of the argument that Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the US atomic bombings offset each other it is claimed that the bombardment on Chongqing and the atomic bombings were equally perpetrating acts. This views means that there was a multilevel of “suffering” and “perpetrating,” that “indiscriminate bombing and “mass slaughter” constituted “crimes against humanity,” and that the atomic bombings were the logical extension of indiscriminate bombing on cities.

Apart from the flawed and self-deceiving thesis focusing on “2 billion dollars pressure”, it seems to me that each of these views and explanations is very convincing, and gives some clues to further investigation into the atomic bombings. This section wants to consider the implication of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki from the new perspective, which shed lights on human experiments as the US motivation for dropping the bomb, rather than on deterrence against the Soviet Union, associated with the origin of the cold war.

10. See, as major studies on the atomic bombings, especially done by American researchers, Blackett, op.cit.; Len Giovannitti and Fred Freed, *Genbakutoukakettei* (Harasyobou, 1967) [The decision to drop the bomb, New York : Coward-McCann, 1965]; Herbert Feis, *Genbaku to dainijisekaitaisen no syuuketsu* (Nansoushya, 1974) [The atomic bomb and the end of World War II, Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1966]; Martin J. Sherwin, *Hametsu heno doutei: genbakuto dainijisekaitaisen* (TBS Britanica, 1978) [A world destroyed: the atomic bomb and the Grand Alliance, New York : Knopf, 1975]; Gar Alperovitz, *Genbakutoukaketsudan no naimaku* Vol.1 and 2 (Horupusyuppan, 1995) [The decision to use the atomic bomb and the architecture of an American myth, New York : A. A. Knopf, 1995]; Ronald Takaki, *Beikoku ha naze nihon ni genbaku wo touka shitanoka* (Soushisya, 1995) [Hiroshima : why America dropped the atomic bomb, Boston : Little, Brown and Co., 1995].

Previous studies have shown a marked tendency to identify the atomic bombings of Japan with the first bombing on Hiroshima, which represents “the first epoch in the human history.” Consequently they often have overlooked the significance of the second bombing on Nagasaki. This tendency is also found in World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs after the Second World War, where “Nagasaki” has been overshadowed by Hiroshima” and not been recognized well. But I believe that another serious “pitfall” lies in this point, because in our inquiry into the US motivation for the atomic bombings we have focused much on similarities between the first bombing on Hiroshima and the second one on Nagasaki—or we have postulated their commonalities—, and as a result have ignored or downplayed the subtle difference between both cases.

As mentioned above, taking into account the relationship with the subsequent escalation of the cold war in the immediate aftermath of WW2, the interpretation appears very convincing that the US dropped atomic bombs to establish its hegemony in the postwar world and to contain the expansion of Soviet influences on Japan. I will not dispute about it. However at the same time my opinion is that there was another factor or intention veiled behind the atomic bombings. In short, my interpretation is that “the atomic bombings were intended to experiment and confirm the devastating effect of a new weapon, and especially to measure its effects on human body.” I have not been fully prepared to prove my thesis in detail here. But at the present moment I believe that in fact there existed multiple or mixed motives in the atomic bombings, but among these both of views of the atomic bombing as deterrence against Soviet Union and as human experiment are especially significant. Therefore the main task should be to clarify and prove to what extent deterring against the Soviet Union and conducting human experiment were critical in the bombings.

Recently the view seems to be gaining a majority among American historians that it was unnecessary to drop atomic bombs on Japan. More specifically, the understanding that “whatever one thinks about the necessity of the first A-bomb, the second—dropped on Nagasaki on August 9—was almost certainly unnecessary” (Barton J. Bernstein)¹¹ is widely shared among them. However there is no attempt on the part of American researchers, I am wondering, to grapple squarely with the question of “why was the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki in the first place?” and to investigate it from the viewpoint of atomic bombings as human experiment. This derives partly from the current situation that few American specialists on the atomic bombings can read historical records in Japanese. In any event it is apparently clear that this is the important clue to the establishment of a common understanding between Japan and the US about atomic bombing issues.

In relation to these arguments, it could be thought that the one of purposes to drop another atomic bomb on Nagasaki was to reconfirm the same devastating effects that had already been brought about on Hiroshima, to minimize influence of the Soviet entry into the war that had occurred shortly after the first bombing, and to give an impression that only the atomic bombings could force Japan to surrender. The atomic bombing of Hiroshima drove the Soviet Union to hasten its originally scheduled date to enter the war from 15 to 8, August. This could be construed as follows: Stalin, General Secretary of the Soviet Union, might have realized the intention of President Truman to force Japan to surrender through the atomic bomb before the Soviet participation in the war; therefore the Soviet Union might have decided to rush into the war against Japan and tried to create a *fait accompli* in order to assure its acquisition of rights and interests

11. Barton J. Bernstein, “Kensyou genbakutoukakettei madeno sanbyakunichi,” *Chuoukouron* (February 1995), p.411 [“The Atomic bombings reconsidered,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol.74, no.1 (January/February 1995)]

specified in the secret agreement at Yalta on February in return for its entrance into the war, although an agreement with the Chinese government under Chiang Kaishek had not been concluded yet. Moreover, while the truth about the atomic bombing of Nagasaki still remains to be clarified, it is said that the bombing had been originally scheduled for August 11, but the date was hastily changed to August 9 through the direction of General Groves in consideration of weather problems.

Now the question is, was President Truman directly involved in the decision making to drop the bomb on Nagasaki, and if so, what specific procedures did he follow and how did he make that decision? If President Truman and State Secretary Byrnes were directly involved, we can assume the possibility that the bombing of Nagasaki could be brought forward for some political reasons, not because of weather conditions. But some evidence to prove this possibility has not been found yet. Alternatively General Groves, who was the director for the Manhattan Project, suggested that President Truman had made the final decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan, but had not been directly involved in the detailed process. Moreover though it is also recognized as the fact that President Truman ordered to abort further atomic bombings including the third one in the wake of the bombing of Nagasaki, the truth about this still remains to be seen.

Some remarkable views and arguments on the second atomic bombing on Nagasaki were proposed mainly by Japanese scholars, especially researchers in Nagasaki. Many of them were closely related to the view of human experiment¹². They approach the atomic bombing from the perspective of Nagasaki, and put an emphasis on the following points: the bomb dropped on Nagasaki was the plutonium-typed, different from the uranium-typed one which had been dropped on Hiroshima; and though it had been tested in Alamogordo, it seemed that the US wanted to check out its devastating effects in actual war fields. These corresponded to the facts that the directive to drop atomic bombs, issued on July 25, had given a strict order to drop two types of the bomb successively as soon as they were prepared. This means that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were regard as “pairs.” In other words it could be argued that the US intended to use the new weapon in actual combat through deliberately destroying the whole city and wiping out the urban population, and that the atomic bombings were richly indicative of the characteristics of human experiment. If it is true, the “atomic bombing myth,” which has been claiming that the atomic bombings were the “humanitarian

12. As a few valuable studies about implications of the bombing of Nagasaki, see, Yoshikazu Inumaru, “Nagasaki ni naze genbaku ga touka saretaka,” *Heiwabunkakenkyuu*, vol.12 (Nagasaki Sougou Kagaku University, 1989); Sadao Kamada, “Nagasakigenbaku toha nan de attaka,” in Maya Morioka Todeskyni (ed.), *Kakujidai ni ikiru watashitachi: Hiroshima-Nagasaki kara gojyunen* (Jijitsushinsya, 1995); Noboru Tazaki, “Nagasaki ni naze?: genbakutouka wo meguru hutatsuno gimon nit suite kousatsu suru,” *Nagasakiheiwakenkyuu*, vol.18 (October 2004). And also see, as the related study in the US, Joseph Laurance Marx, *Nagasaki: The Necessary Bomb?* (Macmillan, 1971). Moreover, as studies focusing on the relationship between the atomic bombings and human experiment, see, Shingo Shibata, “Hibaku gojyunen korekarano kadai: jintaijikken toshiten no genbaku,” *Heiwabunkakenkyuu*, vol.19/20 (Nagasaki Sougou Kagaku University, 1997); Hiroko Takahashi, “Kakujidai ni okeru kokka to kokumin: genbakuiryoujyouhou to minkanbouei,” in Eisaku Kihira (ed.), *Teikoku to shimin: kunou suru amerikaminyusei* (Yamakawasyuppan, 2003). Additionally, as related studies, see, Masae Shiina, *Genbakuhanzai: hibakusha ha naze houchi saretaka* (Outsukisyoten, 1985); Albuquerque Tribune (ed.), *Manhatann keikaku: Plutonium jintaijikken* (Shougakukan, 1994); Masakazu Yamasaki and Shizue Hinokawa (eds.), *Genbaku ha kousite kaihatu saretaka* (Aokisyoten, 1997); Shouji Sawada, *Kyoudoukenkyuu Hiroshima-Nagasakihigai no jissou* (Shinnihonsyuppansya, 1999); Tomoyasu Kawai, *Genbakukaihatu niokeru jintaijikken no jissou: beiseihouchouhoukokusyoo wo yomu* (Shinnihonsyuppansya, 2003).

act” because of its contribution to ending the war promptly and saving great number of lives, will crumble at its foundation. Therefore any “US logics” that have been put forward up to now cannot justify the atomic bombings.

I want to point out some facts to prove this argument. First, the US military designated for the targets of atomic bombings several cities where the devastating effects of the bomb could be fully demonstrated; second, after the target decision had been made any further conventional bombings against those cities were prohibited in order to discern precisely how much devastating effects would be brought about by the bomb; third, different aircrafts were flown to observe weather, take pictures and drop a radiosonde to measure the destructive effects of the bomb in addition to the one loaded with the atomic bomb; fourth, General Groves claimed that “it is insane” to exercise a demonstration or to give a prior warning to Japan before dropping the atomic bomb, because it would just end in undermining the devastating effects of the bomb.”; fifth, the US military in the report issued in the postwar period defined the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as “one experiment” and evaluated the one dropped on Hiroshima as success and the other one on Nagasaki as failure; and lastly, in the occupation period, for the purpose of examining how radiation affected human body the US military treated Hibakusha as if they were experimental animals, collected information on experimental data in the name of medical treatment through ABCC (Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission) and utilized those data for the further development of nuclear weapons. Lastly we can conclude that a true purpose of the atomic bombing was to annihilate the whole population, because it is now clear that the initial target was not a military facility, including Mitsubishi armament factory, but Tokiwabashi at the center of the Nagasaki city.

Furthermore as important facts relevant to those mentioned above, it should be noted that at the point of the spring in 1945, the US leaders, including General Groves and Byrnes, feared that Japan would surrender before the conditions for the atomic bombing were met, and as a result the US would lose the opportunity to drop the bomb; and President Truman indicated his intention to make Japan surrender through peaceful means in order to block the Soviet entry into the war if the testing of atomic bombs failed. Therefore we can draw one hypothesis from those facts that the true purpose for the atomic bombing was not to exercise coercion against the Soviet Union; rather it was among others to take advantage of the last “perfect opportunity” to use the new weapon in the actual war situation and to conduct a human experiment against Japan, which was coming close to surrender.

It is late Shingo Shibata who among others have suggested this hypothesis long before. His words are very persuasive:

What was the purpose of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? One of purposes was to establish the US hegemony in the post-war world, and the other was to “conduct a human experiment” on large scale of people to measure “the effects of the atomic bomb” on human body. Therefore what the US military did in the occupation of Japan was firstly to ban any terrifying accounts of atomic bombs, and monopolized information on “human experiment.” Secondly the US banned medical doctors in Hiroshima and Nagasaki from publishing and exchanging their treatment methods, while they were trying desperately to contrive a treatment technique on burn injuries and radiation diseases, which had no parallel in history. Simultaneously keloidal skins and organs of the dead Hibakusha and bloods of and medical records on survivors were confiscated by the US military. Thirdly the US forced the Japanese government to reject an offer of medical supplies from the International Red Cross. For the US military it did not make any sense to perform an “experiment” if “test animals” were cured,

so it used all the power to hamper any treatment of Hibakusha. Fourthly, the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) was set up in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, not to “cure” Hibakusha, but to observe them as if they were “experiment animals.” Didn’t the very purpose of ‘investigation’ into victims by perpetrators constitute an infringement of Hibakushas’ human rights?¹³

3. Indiscriminate bombing and the atomic bombings: from “Chongqing” to “Hiroshima and Nagasaki”

Another important approach to reexamine problems of the atomic bombings is the perspective to inquire into the relationship between indiscriminate bombing and the atomic bombings, more accurately the viewing of “the atomic bombings as an extension of mass slaughter by indiscriminate bombing.” In terms of this understanding this section firstly reviews the historical development from an origin of indiscriminate bombing to the atomic bombings, followed by a consideration of similarities between the past and present form of indiscriminate bombing.

First of all the origin of indiscriminate bombing, which constitutes one of war crimes as “mass murder of noncombatants (or civilians),” has a close affinity with the development in the theory and practice of strategic bombings. The concept of “strategic bombings” initially meant “precision bombings” over military facilities and industrial areas, and was not necessarily related to “indiscriminate bombing.” However as a war escalated into a total war by the increasing destructive power of weapons, it soon degenerated into indiscriminate bombing, which targeted at the whole urban population and the whole city. Indiscriminate bombing began with the bombing by Nazi Germany to Guernica, Spain, followed by Japanese bombing of Chongqing, China at the end of the year 1938, the US and the UK bombings of Hambourg and Dresden, the US mass air raids on Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya, and finally leading to atomic bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In proportionate to this graded escalation in strategic atrocities, humanitarian and ethical standards among the belligerents also rapidly degenerated.

In relation to these changes in a war and degeneration in moral and normative standards, we should focus on bombing on Chongqing by the Japanese military. While the Japanese military had been mounting an attack on and occupying Shanghai, Nanjing and Wuhan since Manchurian Incident in 1931, this was the first-ever and long-term strategic bombing on Chongqing, the interim capital of then China at which Kuomintang government was based. And it assumed unambiguous characteristics of indiscriminate bombardment from the start.

This bombardment on Chongqing was conducted over five years and six months, from 18 February 1938 to 23 August 1943, with the result of 11,889 deaths, 14,100 injuries, and 17,608 houses destruction¹⁴. Tetsuo Maeda regards bombardment on Chongqing as “Hiroshima preceding to Hiroshima,” and lists its three characters¹⁵. Firstly, it was intended to destroy the whole city and to exterminate the whole urban population. Secondly it was conducted only by air power. Thirdly, its purpose was to dampen the will of fighting on the part of enemy’s leaders and ordinary people. Atrocious indiscriminate bombing by the Japanese military on Chongqing, the capital of then China, came back later as “Boomerang of strategic bombing” to Japan (Tetsuo Maeda), which means a series of the US attacks on Japan, for example mass air raids on Tokyo, Osaka

13. Shingo Shibata (emeritus professor at Hiroshima University), “Hibakushaengohou: mouhitotsu no houri,” *Mainichishinbun*, 6 September 1994.

14. This figure is based on the document delivered at the “International symposium on Chongqing bombing,” held in Chongqing, China, in December 2003. I participated in the symposium and made presentation. See, idem, “Genbakutouka to musabetsubakugeki.”

and Nagoya, and finally the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Additionally, I should point out the following similarities between the US atomic bombings of Japan and indiscriminate bombardment on Chongqing by the Japanese military.

The first similarity is the war aim and military logic that justifies indiscriminate bombing. Its primary purpose is to give “shock” and “awe” to people at large by carpet bombing, and to damp the will and morale of enemy civilians to fight. This point is in common with the war aim of the US and the UK attacks on Iraq, whose name is “shock and awe” or “Operation Iraqi Freedom.”

The second commonality is that those who actually conduct indiscriminate bombing don’t have to feel guilty of the results, because they are far above in the sky and cannot see miserable states of opponents such as their dead bodies. In this respect the atomic bombings are very different from other massacres such as in Auschwitz and Nanjing. It could be argued that this is also reflected in pinpoint air strikes carried out by high-tech weapons and from a faraway place, as though it were a “game.”

Thirdly, there exists the justification that indiscriminate killing or the atomic bombings could bring a quick end to war, and thereby limiting sacrifices to a minimum. But this thinking, it should be emphasized, is nothing but a fraud motivation to pretend as if the barbaric way of war-fighting, which means doing anything in order to win a war, was “humanitarian.”

The fourth is that indiscriminate bombing always involves the testing of and training for a new weapon. For example, in the case of bombings on Chongqing, a new “0-typed fighter aircraft,” “1-typed anti-ground attack aircraft,” and a new incendiary bomb of “new number four” were used. Additionally, it is pointed out that the bombing on Chongqing was positioned as a prelude to coming Japan-US war, and also carried out as exercise for it. It is still fresh in our memories that not only depleted uranium ammunitions and cluster bombs, but also all kinds of new weapons such as Daisy Cutter, thermobaric bombs, and E-Bombs were used in the US war on Afghanistan and Iraq.

The fifth point to note is the emergence of the idea of “total war” in the First and Second World War. It presupposes the conception of war that a victory or defeat in a war depends on state’s economic forces and national solidarity behind the lines which underpin the war-fighting in the front line. It means that it is crucially important to destroy the social and economic infrastructure of enemy states in order to win this “new national war.” And moral norms such as “the distinction between combatants and noncombatants” and “strategic bombing limited to military objectives” increasingly became irrelevant, and then indiscriminate bombardment was repeatedly carried out with its intention to destroy and kill the whole urban population and the whole city.

It should be kept in mind about this point that we can find the combination of colonialism and racism in indiscriminate bombings. This is the idea based on a sort of racial prejudice and discrimination, according to which we represent “justice” and “democracy,” and so we are entitled to employ any kind of means against an evil enemy or inferior nation. As a result, in addition to military and political leaders, ordinary people

15. With regard to the bombing on Chongqing and indiscriminate bombing, see, Tetsuo Maeda, *Senryakubakugeki no sisou: Guernica, Chongqing, Hiroshima heno kiseki* (Asahishinbunsha, 1987).; idem, “Nihon ga sensou no rekishi ni kuwaeta koto: ‘9.11’ heno hojyosen,” in Sanae Isomura and Yasuhiro Yamada (eds.), *Global jidai no heiwagaku* (2): *ima sensou wo tou* (Houritsubunkasya, 2004), pp.58-88; Ronald Schaffer, *Beikoku no nihonkusyuu ni moraru ha attaka: senryakubakugeki no dougitekimondai* (Soushisya, 1996) [*Wings of judgment: American bombing in World War II*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985].

of an enemy state were equally identified with an evil, and then “demonized” and “dehumanized,” so that even mass slaughter of enemy people is justified as eradicating infidels and exterminating pests. This line of thinking has been persistent behind the US attitudes, so that the US impassively conducted mass air raids on Tokyo and dropped two atomic bombs, and still continues to justify those acts even with the knowledge of those tragic effects. What is more, it may be one of facts that it was accelerated by rages and hatreds against the attack on Pearl Harbor and brutal treatments of the allied war prisoners by the Japanese military and its accompanying emotion and mentality for a retaliation and revenge against Japan¹⁶.

It is understood from these consideration that the very same logic was employed in justification for both indiscriminate bombardment and the atomic bombings. But clearly this line of thought is fundamentally rooted in colonialism and racism, and could never be tolerated from the humanitarian viewpoint. Especially I want to lay particular stress on the problem that those ideas justifying indiscriminate bombardment and the atomic bombings have been staying alive in a different form from the past to the present times. In other words, the idea of “just wars” was revived in the gulf war immediately after the end of the cold war, and then was expanded and enhanced into the form of “wars for humanity” and “wars for peace” in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq¹⁷. But this idea is hypocritical and fraud in a way that it cloaks inhumane and atrocious characters of “terror from the air.”

4. Conclusion: toward getting over nuclear deterrence strategy and “a new war in the 21st century

A new nuclear strategy under the Bush administration is found in the report “Nuclear Posture Review (NPR),” which was published by the US Defense Department in January 2002, in parallel with the promotion of “Missile Defense Policy.” This report emphasizes on the need to prepare a plan of nuclear attacks against seven countries (Iraq, Ira, North Korea, Syria, Libya, Russia, and China), some of which do not have nuclear capability; to develop a new compact nuclear weapon capable of penetrating underneath; and to resume the nuclear testings for that end¹⁸.

It should be noted that this report clearly expressed to obtain a preemptive use of nuclear weapons as one of “options.” This corresponded to the fact that in his speech in January of the same year President Bush pointed a finger at Iraq, Iran and North Korea as “axis of evils,” and asserted that traditional nuclear deterrence did not work against those “rogue states” or “state sponsoring terrorism,” and that undertaking preemptive nuclear strikes was the most effective way to deal with them. In this way a new nuclear strategy under the Bush administration was intended to allocate a new role to nuclear weapons as deterrence not only against nuclear attacks but also against any use of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore it is a new characteristic in this context that nuclear weapons are considered to be not “unusable” but “useable” weapons.

The US also unilaterally defected from Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to pursue its Missile Defense Policy. This move was a representative of a new strategy for nuclear weapons under the Bush administration.

16. On some views of the Asian-Pacific war as a “racial war,” see, for example, John Dower, *Yushya naki sensou* (Heibonsya, 2001); Takai, op.cit.; idem, *Double victory: dainijisekaitaisen ha dare no tameno tatakai dattanoka* (2004) [*Double victory: a multicultural history of America in World War II*, Boston : Little, Brown, 2000].

17. See on just war doctrine, for example, Douglas Lummis, *Naze beikoku ha konnani sensou wo surunoka* (Syoubunsha, 2003), particularly, the section “seigi no sensou ha arunoka,” pp.119-130; idem, *Kenpou to sensou* (Syoubunsha, 2000), especially, the section “On just war doctrine,” pp. 198-219.

It means that the US effectively abandoned “Mutual Assured Destruction” strategy which underpinned the “mutual deterrence” with the Soviet Union in the Cold War period, and that it intended to secure its absolute and unilateral supremacy even by expanding nuclear weapons into the outer space.

The US offensive attitudes became more apparent in “US National Security Strategy” published on September 20, 2002. In this new strategy or “Bush Doctrine (a strategy of preventive war or preemptive attacks),” the Bush administration transformed the traditional cold war policy centered on deterrence and “containment”, and with its overwhelming military supremacy in the post-cold war world, announced a new policy to bring a regime change to “rogue states” and “state sponsoring terrorism” by military force, acting unilaterally if necessary. It can be argued that this clearly reflected the US mindset of “a new imperialism” prioritizing its national interests over international cooperation in the UN and with its allies and friendly nations. If we consider the war on Afghanistan as a forerunner to this “Bush Doctrine,” we can conclude that the war on Iraq was the first case to which the doctrine was fully applied.

Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi, who adopted pro-US and hawkish policies, not only showed his “understanding” to the US strategy of the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. But also he has committed his “unqualified support” to the US unilateral attack on Iraq, and its consequent occupation, to which European states such as France and Germany raised strong opposition. In concrete, under Koizumi administration Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, the law mandating humanitarian and reconstruction aid for Iraq, and emergency defense legislation were adopted since 9.11 attacks. Apparently these developments were not completely unrelated to the facts that the ultimate aim to prepare emergency defense laws was to establish an environment where Japan could give “effective supports” to US military actions against “rogue states” and “state sponsoring terrorism” such as Iraq and North Korea, and that Koizumi cabinet took a posture in active cooperation with the US world strategy including a new nuclear strategy, even though it involved Japan into a joint development of missile defense. Moreover it is in these contexts that we have to consider a series of statements and movements that has recently come to the fore. For example some politicians have demanded for altering the three non-nuclear principles and stated that arming Japan with nuclear weapons and using them are constitutional, while some business leaders have pressed for revising the principle banning on arms exports as well as Japanese Constitution.

What is now needed for Japan is not to become an accomplice in a dangerous nuclear and military strategy of the US in a manner as just mentioned above. Instead Japan should make it clear not to permit nuclear weapons and not to fight a war again by going back to the basics of its peace constitution and three non-nuclear principles. And by cooperating together with other states including European states, Japan should make earnest and persistent efforts to persuade and apply brakes to runaway US, which is trying to reverse a stream of internationally accumulated efforts toward nuclear disarmament. George W. Bush was reelected as President of the US as opposed to the world expectation. Given that economic sanctions and a new war against Iran and North Korea are envisioned now, this must have significant implications.

In the context of controversies over the Smithsonian exhibition in 1994, President Clinton said that the decision by President Truman to drop atomic bombs was right. It seems clear from this statement that the overwhelming majority of public opinions in the US still justifies the atomic bombings. And the option of the nuclear pre-emptive strikes based on nuclear deterrence theories has not been abandoned yet. The

18. These description are based on the following my article, see, Akira Kimura, “‘Atarashi sensou’ to hutatsuno sekaichitsujyo no shoutotsu: 9.11 jiken kara sekai ha nani wo manabu bekika,” in *Nihon heiwa gakkai* (ed.), *Heiwa kenkyuu* (special issue: sekaiseihu no tenbou), vol.28 (Waseda University Press, 2003).

problems of “indiscriminate bombing” and “pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons,” which we should have solved within the 20th century, are now being left untouched and turned over to the 21 century. There exists a dangerous prospective that a “new warfare in the twenty-first century” will be well established in a pattern that a unilateral military intervention and pre-emptive strikes backed with the overwhelming military force can be undertaken and justified in the banner of “just wars” and “wars for humanity.”

Japan, through its alliance with the US, will come under the strong influence of these developments, because both “new guidelines for Japan-U.S. defense cooperation” and “Law on a Situation in the Areas Surrounding Japan” have been changing the character and substance of Japan-US Security regime for the past few years. As a consequence, there is an increasing possibility that in addition to traditional “self-defensive wars”, Japan will be required to play a vital role in “just wars” and “humanitarian wars” asserted by the US. Now we ought to be fully committed at this early stage to overcoming these trends¹⁹. Furthermore we should establish a common understanding of the atomic bombings as early as possible, among the whole world as well as between Japan and the US, so as to block a materialization of the worst scenario that the US, which is advancing the development of a new tactical nuclear weapon, would use nuclear weaponries newly in Korean Peninsula in the near future. Therefore ultimately Japan must undertake to reflect seriously on its past and make much more effort to build the genuine democracy²⁰.

According to professor Gar Alperovitz, the US has been engaged in “atomic diplomacy,” in which the power of atomic bombs (or nuclear weapons) is used for expanding political leverages. This “atomic diplomacy” remains employed as the instrument to maintain US global hegemony still in the 21 century. Thus we should empower ourselves to a sufficient degree that we can bring a fundamental change to both all of the nuclear powers that even now stick to nuclear deterrence, and Japan that cannot still free itself from the influence of nuclear umbrella under Japan-US security regime despite its pledge to uphold the three non-nuclear principles.

This article is no more than a preliminary tentative assumption for building a common view of the atomic bombings. It is just a hypothesis that needs to be proved in detail in the future. It is abundantly clear that to establish a common understanding over the issues of the atomic bombings is closely associated with criticizing and getting over a nuclear deterrence strategy, and consequently building a world free of nuclear weapons. In order for us to construct a peaceful world order in the 21st century it is really appreciated that a large number of people, regardless of nationality, occupation, field of expertise, will approach the question of the atomic bombings from a variety of perspectives, and that as a result its truth and the heart of the problem will be more revealed.

19. See, Akira Kimura, “Ima ‘Kyushuu Okinawa’ kara heiwa wo tukurū: ‘Hikakukoubehoushiki’ to chiiki jichitai no heiwayōku,” Hideki Kan (ed.), *21 seiki no anzenhohosyō to nichibeianpotaisei* (Minerva, 2005); idem, “Shin guideline anpotaisei to ‘Kyūsyū-Okinawa’: Chiiki kara tou heiwasenryaku no kouchiku ni mukete,” in Syouji Ishikawa and Kazuomi Hirai (eds.), *Chiiki kara tou kokka, syakai, sekai: “Kyūsyū-Okinawa” kara nani ga mieruka* (Nakanishiyasyuppan, 2000).

20. On the question of the relationship between the atomic bombings and Japanese war responsibility, see, the following short but insightful article, Tetsuya Takahashi, “Beikoku ha Hiroshima, Nagasaki no Genbakutouka wo syazai siteinai noni naze nihon dake ga syazai sinakerebanaranai nodesuka?” *Sekai* (special issue), no. 687 (April 2001).